From remote sensing satellites to hidden 'bra-cams', technology is revealing all; and, with the click of a mouse, intimate details (and, of course, photographs) of Royals, celebrities, politicians and sportspeople are launched on news sites and social media platforms to millions across the globe. Privacy issues regularly crop up in more serious news fare as well. Witness the socalled Vatileaks scandal in May 2012, where the Vatican complained bitterly that books and news reports disclosing the details of leaked church records, including the Pope's private correspondence, were a 'violation of the Pope's privacy'. 1 The law races to catch up, with legislatures and jurists around the world trying to find an appropriate -and often elusive -balance between the individual's right to be left alone and the public's right to know.
Of these four torts, it is the first two -the private facts claim and the intrusion upon seclusion claim -that most resemble the privacy right that is now developing under English and European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence (at least in terms of the interests sought to be protected).
While the formulation of a private facts claim may vary slightly from state to state, generally a media defendant who publishes truthful private facts about a person will be held liable only if revelation of those facts would be 'highly offensive to a reasonable person' and 'is not of legitimate concern to the public'. 8 Since lack of legitimate public interest (or newsworthiness) is an essential element of the tort, US courts have repeatedly held that where the published private facts relate to a newsworthy matter this serves as 'a complete bar to liability'. 9 Moreover, this bar to liability for publication of newsworthy truthful information is not only a common law limitation, but is compelled by First Amendment principles as well. 10 Whereas the private facts tort focuses on speech (i.e. publication of embarrassing private facts), the intrusion upon seclusion tort is concerned with conduct -and, specifically with respect to the press, conduct during the course of newsgathering. Of the four privacy torts, the intrusion claim perhaps best epitomises the 'right to be left alone'. 11 The tort prohibits unconsented-to physical intrusions into traditionally recognised private spaces (such as home or hospital room) as well as unwarranted sensory intrusions into private areas, matters and conversations through eavesdropping, wiretapping or photographic spying. 12 To prevail, the claimant must 9 establish that he or she had an 'objectively reasonable expectation of privacy' in the place, conversation or data source, and that the intrusion would be 'highly offensive' to a reasonable person. 13 Importantly, in stark contrast to developing English and European privacy principles, US law imposes a spatial limitation on the 'zone of privacy' protected by the intrusion tort. Thus, US courts have frequently held that merely photographing a person (whether a public or private figure) in a public place is not an actionable intrusion, 'since he is not then in seclusion, and his appearance is public and open to the public eye'. 14 And this 'public space' limitation on the intrusion tort is applied even if the person's presence or activities in public might otherwise be embarrassing. For example, in United States v Vasquez, 15 the court held that videos of women patients entering and leaving an abortion centre were not actionable since they were taken on a public street, and 'no one walking in this area could have a legitimate expectation of privacy'.
On the flip side, however, if the press invades a truly secluded conversation or space (such as filming in an emergency ward without consent or peeping through bedroom windows), intrusion liability typically follows. Unlike the publication of private facts tort (where newsworthiness serves as a complete bar under First Amendment principles), the fact that a reporter secures 'newsworthy material' through commission of an intrusion tort does not generally serve as a defense to intrusion claims. As one court has explained, '[t]he reason for the difference is simple: the intrusion tort, unlike that for publication of private facts, does not subject the press to liability for the contents of its publication'. 16 As a general rule, the press in its newsgathering activities receives no special First Amendment immunity or exemption from generally applicable laws that govern conduct -such as trespass or wiretap laws for example. 17 ('The First Amendment has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office.' 18 ). Nonetheless, the US Supreme Court has also observed that 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated'. 19 Accordingly, even though newsworthiness does not of itself bar intrusion claims, some courts -in deciding whether a reporter's alleged intrusion was 'highly offensive' (a required element of the tort) -will take into consideration 'the extent to which the intrusion was, under the circumstances, justified by the legitimate motive of gathering the news' 20 (noting that, in considering 'offensiveness' of the intrusion, 'routine … reporting techniques, such as asking questions of people with information (including those with confidential or restricted information) could rarely, if ever, be deemed an actionable intrusion', whereas 'trespass into the home or tapping a personal telephone line … could rarely, if ever, be justified by a reporter's need to get the story') (citations omitted). At bottom, American privacy law, built up over decades, recognises that 'in this sphere of collision between claims of privacy and those of the free press, the interests on both sides are plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our society'. 21 Nonetheless, given the central constitutional role that public discourse plays in the US, even the very court that first adopted the common law privacy right more than a century ago recognised that '[t]he right to privacy is unquestionably limited by the right to speak and print' on 'every matter in which the public may be legitimately interested'. 22 That principle has remained a polestar of American privacy jurisprudence ever since.
The English experience
Privacy law in England and Wales has had a chequered past. In contrast to privacy's longstanding jurisprudential foundations in the US, a free-standing right to privacy was not recognised in English law until October 2000, with the entry into force of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998).
Prior to that, there were one-off cases showing how the courts imperfectly sought to use existing causes of action to engineer some protection for privacy in clear cases of injustice. This approach is epitomised by the case of Kaye v Robertson 23 -which law school professors and lecturers in England cite to illustrate privacy's troubled past. In that case, the claimant was a well-known actor recovering in hospital from serious head and brain injuries after a piece of wood had pierced his car windscreen during a gale. Ignoring numerous notices in the ward, two journalists from the Sunday Sport gained access to his private room, took photographs and conducted an 'interview'. Medical evidence showed Mr Kaye was in no fit condition to be interviewed or to give informed consent -amply evidenced by the fact that a quarter of an hour after the journalists had left, Mr Kaye had no recollection of the incident. In its judgment, the Court of Appeal had to accept, reluctantly, that it was powerless to protect Mr Kaye's privacy as there was no basis on which to do so in English law. It had to find instead that the publication would amount to a malicious falsehood insofar as it implied that Mr Kaye had consented to an interview; but this only meant the Sunday Sport was free to publish the article simply by omitting that implication. Glidewell Even after Campbell, legal certainty did not follow suit. A flood of litigation followed, in which the essential principles emerged and the battle lines of Articles 8 and 10 were argued, and reargued, drawn and redrawn. From this welter of lawsuits has emerged an impressive compendium of English privacy decisions.
As to the controversy this area of law has generated, there are few areas of English law that have been the subject of greater scandalisation and public debate. Many in the UK will recall the spring of 2011 in which the British press became absolutely consumed by the issue of the rich and famous using interim injunctions to suppress publication of information about their personal lives. The issue was brought into sharp focus when an anonymous Twitter user claimed to reveal details of a number of injunctions and 'super-injunctions' sought by celebrities, including footballers and actors, which the UK press was absolutely prohibited from disclosing. A super-injunction is a type of injunction that prohibits the press and others from revealing, not only the facts of the case, but even that an injunction has been issued. Editorials in UK newspapers decried privacy injunctions as an oppressive restraint on freedom of expression and denounced the creation of privacy law by judicial precedent. Politicians also got involved. Prime Minister David Cameron said publicly that he felt 'uneasy' about judges granting injunctions to protect the privacy of powerful individuals.
A report by a judicial committee led by the Master of the Rolls, Lord Neuberger, on the issue of super-injunctions reported in May 2011, concluding that really very few actual super-injunctions had probably ever been granted. Yet the report did not get the public coverage it merited considering the furore that had preceded it.
Since the 'super-injunction spring' of 2011, the unrest has not abated and the issue of privacy continues to be ever-present. In the summer of 2012 it was the turn of the press to come into the firing line, with the closure of the News of the World following the scandal over voicemail interceptions by its reporters (or, as more colloquially etched in the public mind, the 'phone-hacking scandal'). The Leveson Inquiry ensued, the terms of reference of which were to scrutinise the culture and ethics of the press as a whole, but Leveson LJ in his Part 1 Report raised clear concerns about the attitude of the press toward celebrities, observing, for example, that, 'Where there is a genuine public interest in what they are doing, that is one thing; too often, there is not.' He recommended a further tightening of the Data Protection Act 1998 and a review of the damages available in data protection, privacy and breach of confidence cases.
So where does this leave the development of privacy law in England and Wales? In some ways it can be said that the law of privacy is in fairly stable condition considering the quite radical changes it has endured in its relatively short lifetime. There has tended to be a 'wait and see' attitude by English lawyers to privacy law, but the law is in fact relatively well established now and unlikely to see dramatic change. The key tests and legal principles to be applied are very settled. As has been the case for some time in the US, English privacy law may finally have grown up.
Never the twain shall meet?
As Oscar Wilde once observed of the former colonies, 'we really have everything in common with America nowadays except, of course, language.' 28 When it comes to privacy law, however, it may be just the opposite. While the courts of both countries use virtually identical terminology in adjudicating privacy claims -a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' versus a legitimate 'public interest' in disclosure -this similarity in legal lexicon masks a real divide in philosophical approach. Some of these differences are obvious, others less so. But they are ultimately outcome determinative in many cases. Rejecting the German courts' view that privacy rights do not ordinarily extend beyond 'secluded places', the European Court of Human Rights held that, 'anyone, even if they are known to the general public, must be able to enjoy a "legitimate expectation" of protection of and respect for their private life'. 30 Underlying the Court's ruling was the expressed concern that 'photos taken in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion into their private life or even of persecution'. 31 So too, in England, the Court of Appeal in Murray v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd 32 held that it was at least arguable that JK's Rowling's infant son had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of photographs of him being pushed down a public street in a pram, noting that: the law should indeed protect children from intrusive media attention, at any rate to the extent of holding that a child has a reasonable expectation that he or she will not be targeted in order to obtain photographs in a public place for publication. 33 These and other decisions reflect the prevailing view in England and Europe that privacy law protects not only intimate facts and activity in secluded places, but a broader right 'to control the dissemination of information about one's private life' as an inherent aspect of 'human autonomy and dignity'. 34 In 40 In the former English case, the claimant, who was married to the actress Kate Winslet, brought a privacy claim over photographs taken at a private party, some of which showed him partially naked. The photographs could be viewed by his approximately 1,500 'friends' on Facebook. The English courts nonetheless held that the claimant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the photographs and that his Article 8 rights were 'plainly engaged'. In the US case, the plaintiff brought an intrusion upon seclusion claim based on publication of photographs showing him dancing naked from the waist up at a private dance club in Los Angeles, which was attended by at least 1,000 people. Affirming the lower court's dismissal of the suit, the California appeals court ruled that Mr Prince simply could not establish an 'objectively reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place' necessary for an intrusion claim. 41 In the United States, as in England, 'seclusion' and the expectation of privacy are relative, not absolute concepts. This notion of 'limited privacy recognizes that although an individual may be visible or audible to some limited group of persons, the individual may nonetheless expect to remain secluded from other persons and particularly from the world at large'. 42 Thus, for example in Sanders v American Broadcasting Co., 43 the California Supreme Court ruled that an employee could have a reasonable expectation of privacy from undercover news filming of his conversations at his private workplace even though he could be overheard by others in the vicinity. Yet, unlike the much broader Article 8 principles that extend an individual's expectations of privacy into public settings, American courts have consistently held that the press 'is subject to no liability for giving further publicity to that which plaintiff leaves open to the public eye'. 44 It is clear that, in both England and the United States, the law seeks to protect individuals from 'the invasion of some "zone of privacy" which is entitled to be immune from the prying of others'. 45 It is equally clear that the two jurisdictions define that 'zone of privacy' very differently.
Notions of privacy

Legitimate public interest
Both English law and the American private facts tort also compel consideration of whether disclosure of private information furthers a 'legitimate public interest'. But it is particularly here where the two legal systems are separated by a common language.
To balance or not to balance? That is the question
Perhaps the most fundamental distinction between the English and American approach is the relative weight courts in the two nations accord to free expression rights in privacy litigation -a difference that flows in part from their different constitutional charters.
Under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), both privacy (Article 8) and free expression (Article 10) are recognised as fundamental rights. Neither right has priority over the other. In English privacy actions, once the claimant has established that he or she has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy' in the material at issue (thereby engaging Article 8), the media may raise as a defence that publication of that private material is nonetheless 'in the public interest', thereby engaging their Article 10 freedom of expression rights (what English courts call the 'second stage'). But even if the defendant shows that publication is in the public interest, that does not end the inquiry. Instead, the court must then balance these two conflicting rights, with an 'intense focus' on the facts of the particular case, to determine which right should prevail in that case. 46 Unlike Article 8 of the ECHR, the US Constitution does not set forth a 'privacy' right that may be invoked by privacy claimants in civil tort litigation. 47 . is a public figure] '. 51 It could be argued that the same balancing of privacy and speech interests takes place in the UK and US, merely at a different level of abstraction. But we believe that would be a mistaken view. The very formulation of competing first principles indicates that, from the outset, the two jurisdictions assign different weight to freedom of expression. Thus, in England and Wales, 'it has to be accepted that any rights of free expression, as protected by Article 10, … must no longer be regarded as simply "trumping" any privacy rights that may be established'; 52 while, in the US, '[w]hen the subject matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is no invasion of privacy'. 53 Freedom of expression is thus accorded greater weight in the US than in the UK. Indeed, this fundamental difference of approach is highlighted by the fact that, in privacy actions in the UK, publication on a matter of public interest is a 'defence' (with the burden of proof on defendant), whereas, in the US, it is typically referred to as a First Amendment 'privilege' (with the burden on the claimant, as an element of the private facts tort, to establish lack of newsworthiness). 54 In short, under the English approach, even disclosures on matters of great public importance may not necessarily prevail over privacy rights if those privacy interests are particularly weighty. In the US, by contrast, '[n]ewsworthiness is the rock on which most privacy claims founder'. 55 
Defining 'legitimate public interest': Of vapid tittle-tattle and deference to editorial judgement
In addition to taking different approaches to the fundamental question of how to strike the balance between privacy and free expression interests, English and US courts also differ in how they define and determine matters of 'legitimate public interest' -though there are surely similarities as well.
How to assess whether publication of intimate private facts is in the 'public interest' (or, in American lexicon, is 'newsworthy') is a notoriously difficult question that has bedevilled courts around the world. As one court has noted, if newsworthiness is completely 'descriptive' -if all coverage that sells papers or boosts ratings is deemed newsworthy -then 'it would seem to swallow the publication of private facts tort' since 'it would be difficult to suppose that publishers were in the habit of reporting occurrences of little interest'. 56 At the other extreme, if newsworthiness is viewed as a  purely normative concept (with courts picking and choosing what is and is  not meritorious reporting) , 'the courts could become to an unacceptable degree editors of the news and self-appointed guardians of public taste'. 57 Inevitably, the very task of determining whether publication of private facts furthers a legitimate public interest 'does involve courts to some degree in a normative assessment'. 58 Yet, in the US, two important principles apply to limit the risk that assessments of newsworthiness will be dictated by the individual tastes of judges or jurors. First, 'newsworthiness' is not limited to 'news' in the narrow sense of just reports of current events involving issues of public debate. 'It also extends to the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for purposes of education, amusement, or enlightenment, when the public may reasonably be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.' 59 61 In addition to broadly defining the types of uses deemed 'newsworthy', US courts also typically give 'considerable deference' to the editorial judgements of reporters and editors. 62 United States courts require that, for the newsworthiness privilege to apply, there must be a 'logical nexus' between publication of the private facts at issue and a matter of legitimate public concern (what English courts call 'proportionality'). 63 But sensitive to the need to avoid unconstitutional interference with editorial judgment, US courts have consistently stated that '[t]he constitutional privilege to publish truthful material "ceases to operate only when an editor abuses his broad discretion to publish matters that are of legitimate public interest"'. 64 Or, as one jurist more succinctly put it, except for extreme cases involving morbid prying for its own sake, 'it is not for a court or jury to say how a particular story is best covered'. 65 These limiting principles in the United States stand in stark contrast to the English approach. Unlike the deference given to editorial judgment in the US, in England and Wales the assessment of whether publication of private information constitutes a matter of public interest is very much an issue solely in the hands of the judge -with English jurists taking a decidedly more sceptical view of the press. The concept of 'proportionality' is key under the European Convention on Human Rights, and it is not uncommon for an English judge to dissect an article post-publication to determine which parts of it 'overstepped' the mark. Yet this can lead to unpredictability and a divergence in opinion between judges as to where the precise line should be drawn. This is best exemplified by the Campbell case, in which a majority of the House of Lords held that the defendant newspaper was entitled to publish the fact of Naomi Campbell's drug addiction and treatment as a matter of public interest, but that the newspaper had overstepped the bounds of what could legitimately be published by disclosing additional details about her treatment and publishing a photograph of her coming out of a Narcotics Anonymous meeting. Lord Nicholls and Lord Hoffmann (dissenting), however, found that these additional details were 'peripheral' and did not materially add to the level of intrusion. Lord Nicholls also thought that the details added important colour and conviction to the story and were well within the bounds of editorial discretion -a position not shared by the majority.
The close scrutiny which English courts pay to issues of proportionality can also be seen in Browne v Associated Newspapers Ltd, 66 a case in which the ex-partner of Lord Browne of Madingley, the then Group Chief Executive of BP, sought to sell his story to the Mail on Sunday. In considering whether an injunction should be granted, the Court of Appeal separated out and carefully examined each category of information to be published by the newspaper. The Court made a distinction between reporting the 'bare fact' of a sexual relationship and information as to the contents and detail of that relationship. 67 The result was that the Court of Appeal upheld an injunction which closely dictated which categories of information could and could not be published. This type of 'blue-pencilling' of news articles by judges is quite different from the US approach, under which 'courts do not, and constitutionally could not, sit as superior editors of the press'. 68 So In the English courts as well, there has long been a judicial distaste towards celebrity gossip which is perceived to serve no public interest purpose. For example, Baroness Hale in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl 73 distinguished between a 'real public interest' and information which merely interests the public, stating that 'the most vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers' wives and girlfriends interests large sections of the public but no one could claim any real public interest in our being told all about it'. So too, in Campbell v MGN, Lord Hope made clear that 'newsworthiness' -the touchstone of US law -was not a criterion that was applicable in English law, stating that it was 'not enough to deprive Miss Campbell of her right to privacy that she is a celebrity and that her private life is newsworthy'. 74 In sum, in assessing 'public interest' in privacy litigation, English and US courts follow very different rules of the road.
Injunctions and damages
The differences in the US/UK approach to privacy also carry over into the remedies available for alleged privacy violations. Pre-publication injunctions are almost never granted in the US. Under First Amendment principles, 75 As a result, the remedy of a claimant alleging publication of private facts is invariably confined to postpublication damages. 76 In contrast, pre-publication injunctions are more commonly granted in England and Wales to provide protection for privacy rights. The availability of this remedy is considered by English claimants to be a key advantage of privacy claims over libel, where it is far more difficult to obtain interim injunctions due to the age-old hurdles in Bonnard v Perryman, 77 by which an injunction will not be granted unless the court is satisfied that a defence of justification (or other defence) cannot succeed. This advantage has been exploited in several cases where complaints that were plainly about damage to reputation have been 'squeezed' into actions for breach of privacy/confidence in an attempt to circumvent the Bonnard v Perryman roadblocks. English courts, however, have become more astute to this tactic and in some cases have refused injunctions partly for this reason. 78 Damages in the UK for breaches of privacy are fairly modest, especially when compared to the awards granted to successful privacy claimants in the US. The highest recorded award was £60,000 in Mosley, 79 a case in which the trial judge, Eady J, stated that the scale of the claimant's distress and indignity was 'difficult to comprehend' and 'probably unprecedented', after the News of the World famously published photographs and video footage of the claimant engaging in sexual acts with five prostitutes. Other privacy awards have not come nearly as high, with most remaining in the £2,000-£15,000 bracket.
